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MODELS OF RATIONING
INTRODUCTION TO RATIONING
THEODORE R. MARMOR & JAN BLUSTEiN-
A good deal of the popular commentary on rationing, relying on
images of the meager medical care portions that are given out
abroad, portrays it as a fearsome but inevitable alternative to our
present medical care arrangements. The British National Health
Service ("NHS") provides the doomsayers' favorite illustration.
Indeed, the prevailing conception of the NHS among hostile
American critics is of "a monster, painted on a pole," a system in
which patients suffer
endless waits to see overworked and undertrained staff in obsolete
and undermaintained facilities. Patients may even be denied life-
saving treatment if they are old or for other reasons fail to receive
high enough priority for scarce services whose availability is
controlled by heartless, or at least unaccountable, bureaucrats.
1
A remarkable feature of such caricatures is their incongruity
with the more formal notions of rationing developed by many
economists and policy analysts. Economists take a particularly
benign view of "rationing," equating it with "allocation." In their
view, market economies ration access to goods and services by price
(ability or willingness to pay). Our present medical care system is
a marketplace where private and social insurance allow both cost
sharing and risk pooling, permitting allocation to those who might
not otherwise have purchased goods and services at their full price.
From this perspective, our present system of "rationing" is hardly a
monster. If it is a monster, it is, at least, one with which we are
intimately familiar.
Policy analysts exhibit less agreement about the meaning of
"rationing." Most of them distinguish between macroallocation
(referring to decisions about how resources are distributed to
t Professor Theodore Marmor teaches politics, policy, and law at Yale University's
School of Organization and Management. Dr.Jan Blustein is a physician and a fellow
in health policy at New York University's Robert F. Wagner School.
1 Robert G. Evans, "Rationing"Health Care: The Loaded Alternative, FRONTIERS OF
HEALTH SERV. MGMT., Fall 1987, at 31, 31.
(1539)
1540 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 140:1539
institutions or types of services-for example, decisions about how
many open heart surgery beds there will be in a region) and
microallocation (referring to decisions about how resources are to be
distributed to individuals-for example, decisions about who is to
receive open heart surgery). And most would assign the label
"rationing" to microallocational decision making.2 But of course,
"rationing" in this more restricted sense can only be a monster if
health services are scarce. If there are enough to go around, there
is no reason to fear microallocational rulemaking. Indeed, the
proposal to cut waste by using "clinical guidelines" or "practice
parameters," which we describe in detail in our own contribution to
this Symposium,8 has been immensely appealing precisely because
it has been promoted as a way of making microallocational rules
without denying anyone anything of benefits: It is rationing without
pain.
Claims about the inevitability of rationing begin with the
assumption that the present crisis has its roots in financial scarcity.
From this premise it is inferred that hard choices are inevitable. We
take exception to such arguments because they fail .to distinguish
between the "tragic choices" of true scarcity-for example, the case
where there is one transplantable organ and two potential recipi-
ents4-and the garden variety scarcity that arises from shortcomings
in existing arrangements-for instance, the case in which there is
only one mammography machine and patients must book an
appointment for routine screening examinations a month in
advance.5 The failure to attend to these fundamentally different
forms of scarcity leads pundits to assert that Oregon's rationing
plan is sadly inevitable because its present Medicaid budget can no
longer be expanded-rather than because the state's wealth cannot
support a decent level of medical care for the poor.6 In making
this distinction, we do not mean to imply that the politics of
modifying budgetary constraints are trivial. We do mean to suggest,
2 See ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 78 (1988); Roger W. Evans, Health
Care Technology and the Inevitability of Resource Allocation and Rationing Decisions, 249
JAMA 2047, 2048 (1983); Michael D. Reagan, Health Care Rationing: What Does it
Mean?, 319 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1149, 1151 (1988).
3 SeeJan Blustein & Theodore R. Marmor, CUrING WASTE BY MAKING RULES:
PROMISES, PITFALLS, AND REALISTIC PROSPECTS, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (1992).
4 See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHIIP BOBBIT, TRAGIC CHOICES 21 (1978).
5 See id. at 22.
6 Numerous instances of such punditry (and critics' replies) can be found in
Lawrence D. Brown, The National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH AFF.,
Summer 1991, at 28.
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however, that claims about the inevitability of rationing must be
critically evaluated in light of the real facts of service availability and
financial strain.
In the pages that follow, our colleagues expand on many of
these issues. In so doing they will necessarily address questions of
the allocation of medical resources, and some will develop models
of its appropriate form. Whether termed "rationing" or, as some
policy analysts, we among them, would prefer, the "microallocation
of medical services," several broad issues are pertinent and
important.
The first has to do with the dynamics of resource allocation in
this contentious field. What methods are best suited to addressing
who gets what, when, and where? There is no avoiding this
question of allocation, but there is ample dispute about the right
answer. What, for example, are the predictable strengths and
weaknesses of such decisionmaking through government? What
about doing so through market transactions? In the case of
governmental allocation, what is to be said about the expected
features of using administrative agencies, of depending upon courts,
of relying on a mix of separate "powers?" These questions, though
exceedingly controversial, are unavoidable. To the extent they have
not been regularly raised in American health policy, they have been
answered by default.
The second broad class of issues concerns the standards that
should be applied to allocational rules by any institution. Should
the relevant standards be largely professional ones: what the doctor
(or nurse, or physiotherapist) thinks is appropriate? Ought
organizations of medical professionals set the standards not only
"for what works" but what allocational rules "make scientific sense?"
Should governmental authorities control budgets alone or ought
they actively engage in this setting of micro-allocational standards?
What about direct public involvement in standard-setting? Is this
an arena for direct democracy? That is, should there be open
participation in the sense of various publics deciding what the
standards ought to be, how loose or slack, and with what avenues
for dispute and review?
Finally, there is the central question of to whom the contemplat-
ed rationing ought to apply. Should it be egalitarian; must the
rules apply to all cases if applied to any? For example, were
governments to restrict the supply of some new technology and to
pay for the technology's use only when deemed professionally
"necessary," should it be permissible to buy such services "in the
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market?" If supplements are allowed, ought they be insurable under
tax deductible private health insurance? Is there one set of rules for
those covered by public plans and another for those not covered?
What happens if the United States turns to universal health
insurance? How "universalistic" are our rules in their application?
Are there grounds for treating some groups specially? Who are they
and on what basis?
7
7 To make these questions less abstract, note that Canada explicitly forbade
private insurance for publicly financed services when its universal program of medical
insurance began. No group was permitted to "top up" payment for any particular
service with private insurance. This restriction limited severely the market for
"extras." It represented an egalitarian conception of health care access and an
understanding of how cost containment was related to having a universal plan that
was really comprehensive in its application. Seegenerally ROBERT G. EvANs, STRAINED
MERCY: THE ECONOMICS OF CANADIAN HEALTH CARE 34-52 (1984).
